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I. INTRODUCTION
Rule 154, promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission,'
has caused much excitement in the financial community of late. As re-
cently as 1966, the Securities and Exchange Commission issued a release
so as to alert the public to the inherent limitations of its Rule 154.2 Also,
the recent case of United States v. Wolfson' for the first time employed
Rule 154 as the indirect means of imposing criminal sanctions upon a
"control person" for selling unregistered securities.
The purpose of this comment is to develop and explain the reasons,
complexities and ramifications of Rule 154.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Related Statute: Section 5
To comprehend the complexities of Rule 154, one must first under-
stand the reason for its creation. This can best be understood by examin-
ing related statutes.
Section 5 of the Securities Act of 19334 prohibits offers both to sell
and to buy a security before a registration statement is filed with the
SEC if the facilities of interstate commerce or the mails are used. Section
* Member of the Editorial Board, University of Miami Law Review.
1. 17 C.F.R. § 230.154 (Rev. 1968).
2. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4818 (Jan. 21, 1966).
3. United States v. Wolfson, 405 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1968).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1964).
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5 is the means of fulfilling the legislative objective of the 1933 Act. The
investing public was intended to have available to it adequate information
upon which it could make an informed judgment with respect to the
purchase of securities.
The prohibition against the interstate sales of unregistered securities
must be read in conjunction with the exemptions from registration as
permitted by the 1933 Act. Thus, stated in elementary terms, a security
must be registered before being offered for interstate sale unless an ex-
emption under or pursuant to an act of Congress is applicable.5
B. Related Statute: Section 4(1)
Section 4(1) of the 1933 Act' exempts from the registration require-
ments of section 5 transactions by persons other than issuers, underwriters
or dealers. The purpose of this exemption is obviously to exempt from
registration the transaction of ordinary investors.
It is therefore important to ascertain the definition of an issuer, an
underwriter, and a dealer. Section 2 (12),' in defining a dealer, states that
any person who engages either for all or part of his time, directly or in-
directly, as agent, broker of principal in the business of offering, buying,
selling, or otherwise dealing or trading in securities issued by another is
a dealer.
Section 2(4)8 defines an issuer as one who issues or proposes to
issue a security.
Section 2(11)0 defines an underwriter as "any person who has pur-
chased from an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer in
connection with, the distribution of any security, or participates or has
a direct or indirect participation in any such undertaking. . . ,"I The last
sentence of 2 (11) states that the word "issuer" includes in addition to
an issuer any person directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by
the issuer or any person under direct or indirect common control with the
issuer.
Thus, the definition of underwriter in section 2 (11) is said by many
to be the most significant definition in the Securities Act of 1933. Because
of its far-reaching effect, one may be a "statutory underwriter" within
section 2 (11) even though he has no connection with the securities busi-
ness. Further, a control person may be a "statutory issuer" for the pur-
pose of making another a "statutory underwriter."
5. Various sections of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934 impose civil and criminal penalties for violation of § 5.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 77(d)(1) (1964).
7. Id. § 77(b)(12).
8. Id. § 77(b)(4).
9. Id. § 77(b) (11).
10. However, the statute goes on to state that such term shall not include a person
whose interest is limited to a commission from an underwriter or dealer not in excess of
the usual and customary distributor's or seller's commission. Id.
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The ramifications of section 2 (11) can best be shown by the use of
examples:
Example 1-Suppose ABC, Inc. sells securities to X, a non-control
person. X purchases the securities with the view to distribute them for the
issuer. X would be a "statutory underwriter" within the meaning of sec-
tion 2 (11) and would not be entitled to the exemption from registration
permitted to persons other than issuers, underwriters or dealers. It should
be noted that if instead of purchasing the securities from ABC, Inc. and
subsequently reselling them, X merely distributed the securities for ABC,
Inc., the same result would follow.
Example 2-Suppose X, a "control person" in ABC, Inc., is the cur-
rent owner of 1000 shares of ABC securities. If X sells the securities to
Y, and Y purchases the securities with the view to distribute them for X,
Y would be a statutory underwriter. Because of the last sentence of section
2 (11), X would be considered an issuer for the purpose of making Y a
statutory underwriter.
C. The Concept of Control
The words "control person" have been used above without being
defined. Their meaning is of extreme importance, because a person who
is in control of an issuer is in virtually the same position as the issuer
itself insofar as registration of the securities is required."-
The control status is not determined by any one fact. Rule 405 of
the Securities Act 2 defines control as the possession, direct or indirect,
of the power to cause the direction of the management and policies of a
person. This definition is obviously vague and highly dependent upon the
facts of each case."
Although the control concept under the 1933 Act is not defined by
statute, it was expressly passed upon in United States v. Re,'4 wherein
it was held that control is no different under the Act from what it is in
normal every day usage. The court said that the requirement of reason-
able certainty does not preclude the use of ordinary terms to express ideas
which find adequate interpretation in common usage and understanding."
Everyone would agree that ownership of 51% of the voting power
of a corporation is undoubtedly control.' 6 However, a lesser amount of
voting power could constitute control. In fact, many believe that ownership
of 10% of the voting securities of a corporation raises a rebuttable pre-
sumption of control.'
11. H. SOWARDS, COMMENTS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SECURITIES REGULATION 159
(1966).
12. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (Rev. 1968). See also SEC v. Micro-Moisture Controls, Inc. 148
F. Supp. 558, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
13. See Thompson Ross Securities Co., 6 S.E.C. 1111 (1940).
14. 336 F.2d 306, 316 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 904 (1964).
15. Id.
16. See Thompson Ross Securities Co., 6 S.E.C. 1111 (1940).
17. This is probably due to the fact that Rule 16, promulgated under the Securities
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The fact that one is an officer or director of a corporation, although
indicative of control, is not determinative of the question. It is possible
that such officer or director has consistently and vehemently opposed
the actions of the majority. If this is the case, the control status on the
part of the officer or director would be negated. Conversely, the following
factors would strongly indicate the control status of an officer or direc-
tor: i8
(1) participation in active management;
(2) necessity of his stock to establish a quorum at the annual share-
holders meeting;
(3) consistency in going along with the actions of others in man-
agement; and
(4) his ownership of perhaps 5 % or more of the outstanding voting
securities.
D. Related Statute: Section 4(4)
Section 4(4), formely 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933,19 is com-
monly referred to as the broker's exemption. However, not all broker's
transactions are exempt.
Until 1946, the Commission took the position that if a broker effected
an isolated transaction for a control person, the broker was entitled to
the broker's exemption.2" In other words, the Commission felt that the
broker was not an underwriter even though he technically was selling
for an issuer within the contemplation of section 2 (11).
The caveat of the time was that a broker effecting a distribution of
a substantial amount of securities would of necessity perform duties
which were considered abnormal to the function of a broker.2 If such
were the case, it was unequivocably felt that such a broker, who had ex-
ceeded his ordinary brokerage functions in relation to a transaction, would
be deemed an underwriter. Hence, the broker could not escape registration
via the predecessor of 4(4).
During the "bull" market of 1945 and 1946, it became obvious that
large amounts of securities could be sold without any abnormal brokerage
functions. It was in the midst of this realization that the Commission
decided the Ira Haupt' case. In an administrative proceeding against
the Haupt firm it was learned that 93,000 shares, constituting nearly 36%
of the outstanding stock of a corporation, were sold through Haupt by
controlling shareholders. The Commission stated that section 4(2), now
and Exchange Act of 1934, and form S-I, the most often used application for registration,
differentiate between 10% owners of securities and less-than-10% owners.
18. See H. SOWARDS, 11 THE FEDERAL SECURITIES AcT § 4.04[2] (1968).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 77(d)(4) (1964).
20. L. Loss, 1 SECURITIES REGULATION 700 (2d ed. 1961).
21. Id. at 701.
22. Ira Haupt & Co., 23 S.E.C. 589 (1946).
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4(4), exempts trading but not a distribution by a broker for a control
person.S Consequently, the exemption was not permitted.
In accordance with the Haupt case a new caveat came into being, i.e.,
a broker effecting a distribution for a control person acts as an under-
writer and thus is not entitled to the broker's exemption for his part of
the transaction.
It soon became apparent that it was at times very difficult to distin-
guish between a non-exempt secondary distribution and the kind of bro-
kerage transaction on behalf of a control person which was still exempt
from the registration requirements of the 1933 Act.
Despite the confusion caused by the Haupt case, the predecessor of
section 4(4) was not amended. This was because of the Commission's
assurance of a future rule which would explain in more precise terms when
a broker is to be considered a broker and when he is to be considered
an underwriter.24 After much deliberation, the Commission promulgated
Rule 154.25
III. RULE 154
A. In General
In accordance with Rule 154 the term "broker's transaction" in
section 4(4) is defined to include a transaction by a broker acting as agent
for a control person if four conditions are present. In brief, the broker
can perform no more than the usual broker's function; the broker can
receive no more than the usual brokerage commission; the broker can-
not solicit the buy order; and the broker must not be aware of circum-
stances indicating that the transaction is part of a distribution or that the
broker's principal is an underwriter. 6
Securities Act Releases indicates that Rule 154 was not intended to
provide an exemption from registration for the control person, but solely
to exempt the selling broker's transaction. "7 The control person must still
find his own exemption if the securities are not offered and sold in com-
pliance with the registration requirements of the 1933 Act. However, as
will be explained later, what Rule 154 does not do directly with respect
to finding an exemption for the control person it does accomplish indi-
rectly.
B. Conditions of Exemption Explained
Rule 154 explains that one condition which a broker must fulfill in
in order to qualify under the 4(4) exemption is that he perform no more
23. Id. at 602.
24. L. Loss, 1 SECURITIES REGULATIoN 704 (2d ed. 1961).
25. 17 C.F.R. § 230.154 (Rev. 1968).
26. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4818 (Jan. 21, 1966).
27. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4669 (Feb. 17, 1964); SEC Securities Act Release
No. 4818 (Jan. 21, 1966).
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than the usual and customary broker's function. In this respect the par-
ticular transaction in question is examined independently from the firm's
general activities.18
The broker's functions in relation to the particular transaction must
be distinguished from that of an underwriter or a dealer. This can be
accomplished by receiving the normal brokerage commission for services
performed in the capacity of an agent for his principal.2"
Another condition of qualification states that the broker must do no
more than execute an order to sell as a broker and receive no more than
the customary broker's commission. Further, the broker's principal, to the
knowledge of the broker, must make no payment in connection with the
execution of such transaction to any person. °
Listed securities present no problem in ascertaining the customary
broker's commission as a schedule exists for stock exchange transac-
tions.3' However, commissions with respect to unlisted securities often
do raise problems.
In an effort to prevent the creation or stimulation of a market for
the securities prior to registration, the broker will lose his section 4(4)
exemption if he has knowledge that his principal has paid another person
in connection with the transaction. 2
A further condition states that neither the broker nor, to his knowl-
edge, his principal solicits or arranges for the solicitation of orders "to
buy" in anticipation of or in connection with such transactions. This con-
dition of the broker's eligibility of the section 4(4) exemption prohibits
only the solicitation of "buy orders" from the broker's customers. The
broker is free to solicit the "sell order" from the control person.83 This
is apparently because of the fact that the rule is primarily designed for
the protection of buyers, not sellers.
The last condition states that the broker must not be aware of cir-
cumstances indicating that his principal is an underwriter in respect to
the securities or that the transactions are part of a distribution on behalf
of his principal. In other words, if the control person (the principal in the
transaction) purchased the securities with a view to resell, or was other-
wise an underwriter within the definition of section 2(11), the control
person's broker could not take advantage of Rule 154.
It should be noted that "the broker must make a reasonable investi-
gation with respect to the controlling person's status as an underwriter
and with respect to whether the proposed transaction will constitute a
distribution."34
28. Stadia Oil & Uranium Co. v. Wheelis, 251 F.2d 269 (10th Cir. 1957).
29. H. SOWARDS, 11 THE FEDERAL SECURITIES ACT § 4.04[31 (c) (1968).
30. 17 C.F.R. § 230.154 (Rev. 1968).
31. H. SOWARDS, 11 THE FEDERAL SECURITiES ACT § 4.04[3), n.63 (1968).
32. Id. at § 4.04[3](e).
33. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4818 (Jan. 21, 1966).
34. H. SOWARDS, 11 THE FEDERAL SECURITiES ACT § 4.04[31 (e) (1968).
The Commission takes the view that "[t]he broker is at least obligated to question his
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C. Rule of Thumb: Guidelines
In order for the broker to be exempt from registration his "control"
seller must not be involved in a distribution. Paragraph B of Rule 154
explains what a distribution is by stating what it is not: No distribution
will be involved if the transactions do not involve a substantial amount
in relation to the number of shares or units of the outstanding securities
and the aggregate volume of trading in such security. This raises the all
important question: what is substantial?
Rule 154 provides the following rule of thumb for distinguishing
trading from distribution in routine cases: It is not a distribution if all
sales made by or on behalf of the same person within six months do not
exceed the lesser of one percent of the outstanding shares or, where the
security is listed, one week's volume of trading within the preceeding four
calender weeks.85
A word of caution is in order. The 1% rule is only a guideline which
must be read in conjunction with Rule 154's position that if a substantial
amount of securities are traded in relation to the aggregate amount of
trading the exemption will be lost. Thus, when dealing with an irregularly
traded unlisted security even though the 1% rule is met, the exemp-
tion may be disallowed. The converse of this is also true. As stated by
Mr. Shreve, the Executive Assistant Director of the Division of Corporate
Finance, "I recall one case where the volume of trading over the counter
was substantially greater than the volume of trading on the exchange-
the real market was over the counter-we were able to arrive at some
conclusion that a somewhat greater amount of stock could be sold than
the exchange would permit under the rule of thumb.""0
IV. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF BROKER IN
COMPLYING WITH RULE 154
A. Who Is a "Person" for Calculating Sales
within the Previous Six Months?
Rule 154(b) requires the inclusion of all sales by the same person or
his associates within the preceeding six months in order to determine
the amount of securities remaining to be traded under the six-months/
1% guideline of Rule 154.17 Further, if the control person's sales within
the previous six-month period are but a part of a concert of action being
effected by a group of closely related persons of which the control person
is a member, the offering of the group as a whole would have to included
customer to obtain facts reasonably sufficient under the particular circumstances to indicate
whether his customer is engaged in a distribution or is an underwriter." SEC Securities Act
Release No. 4818 (Jan. 21, 1966).
35. 17 C.F.R. § 230.154 (Rev. 1968).
36. Shreve, Unsolicited Brokers' Transactions and Investment Stock, in SacuRarrms
LAws aND REGuLATION S INSTITUTE 91, 100 (H. Sowards ed. 1967).
37. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4818 (Jan. 21, 1966).
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as a single computation under Rule 154(b). If the specified amount was
exceeded, the exemption is unavailable.88 This is because Rule 154 was
not intended to provide an exemption for portions of group distributions.
In making this calculation all transactions including previously
exempt ones within the previous six-month period must be included.89
Thus the broker of a control person, in a corporation with 1,000,000
shares outstanding, who has within the previous six months sold 10,000
shares or more through another exemption permitted by the Securities
Act of 1933, cannot effectuate the transfer of additional shares for the
control person.
B. Must the Broker of a Control Person's
Donee Comply with Rule 154?
"If a distribution is a reasonable consequence of a gift by a control
person, registration may be required," 0 but Rule 154 and section 4(4)
have been used in such situations without objection on the part of the
Commission.4' However, it is necessary to calculate the exemption avail-
able to the control person at the time of the sale.42 The combined sales of
the donor, his associates and the donee should not exceed the limitations
set forth in Rule 154(b). Conversely, the number of shares given to a
donee and then sold should be taken into account in determining whether
the control person is within the limits of routine trading insofar as a
broker selling for the control person is concerned.43
C. Must the Broker of a Control Person's
Pledgee Comply with Rule 154?
In accordance with the Guild Films44 case, when a lender accepts
securities from a control person as collateral for a loan, absent an exemp-
tion, the lender must comply with the registration and the prospectus
requirements of the Securities Act before he can sell the securities. However,
since the pledgee, in effect, stands in the shoes of and acts for the pledgor
in selling the collateral (securities), the SEC takes the position that the
broker may sell for both the lender and the borrower if the total dis-
positions are within the limitation of Rule 154(b)."5
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Shreve, Unsolicited Brokers' Transactions and Investment Stock, in SEcURITIES
LAWS AND REGULATIONS INSTITUTE 91, 101 (H. Sowards ed. 1967).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4818 (Jan. 21, 1966).
44. SEC v. Guild Films Co., 279 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied 364 U.S. 819
(1960).
45. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4669 (Feb. 17, 1964); SEC Securities Act Release
No. 4818 (Jan. 21, 1966).
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D. What is the Effect of Compliance with Rule 154(b)
in Consecutive Six-Month Periods?
The SEC takes the position that a plan to effect a series of sales
every six months must result in a distribution beyond the limitations of
the Rule."6 Thus, repetitive compliance with the one percent guideline of
Rule 154(b) cannot assure the section 4(4) exemption for the broker.
This writer believes that this point is in dire need of clarity because of
its vagueness. It is understood by this writer that no one knows how many
successive six-month periods are within the routine trade requirement
of Rule 154.
V. THE INDIRECT EFFECT OF RULE 154 ON THE CONTROL
PERSON (UNITED STATES V. WOLFSON)
The correlative of the problems facing the broker for noncompli-
ance with Rule 154 concerns itself with the control person.
The recent landmark case of United States v. Wolfson was the first
to impose criminal sanctions on a control person for selling unregistered
stock. The facts indicate that between August, 1960, and January, 1962,
2,510,000 shares of Continental Enterprises, Inc., an unlisted corporation,
were issued and outstanding. The Wolfson group, including Wolfson
himself, his family and his right-hand man, owned in excess of 40% of
of the outstanding shares. During the period in question the group sold
in excess of 625,000 shares of Continental through various brokerage
houses.
The court found that although Wolfson was neither a director nor
an officer in Continental, "(a)s the largest individual shareholder he was
Continental's guiding spirit. . . "48i.e., a control person. Thus, his sales
of unregistered stock were in violation of section 5 of the Securities Act
of 1933.
A defense raised by Wolfson on appeal was that his sales were
exempt under section 4(1) of the 1933 Act either because he was not
himself an issurer, underwriter or dealer, or alternatively because the
brokerage houses through which his sales were accomplished were not
underwriters.49 It was argued that while a "controlling person" of an
issuer may be deemed an issuer for purposes of the definition of an
"underwriter," he is not an issuer for purposes of section 4(1).
In dismissing the above argument the Second Circuit stated that
section 4(1) by its terms exempts only transactions, not persons. Since
the brokers provided outlets for the stock of issuers within section 2 (11),
they were underwriters. Therefore, the stock was sold in transactions by
underwriters which are not within the exemptions of 4 ( 1).
46. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4818 (Jan. 21, 1966).
47. United States v. Wolfson, 405 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1968).
48. Id. at 97571.
49. Brief for Appellant at ii; id. at 97572.
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In response to the argument that the brokers in the case could not
be classified as underwriters because their part in the sales transactions
came within section 4(4), the broker's exemption, the court said that
section 4(4) was designed only to exempt the broker's part in security
transactions. The court implied that although the 1%7o guideline of Rule
154 had been exceeded, the section 4(4) exemption could be applicable
to the brokers if they were not aware of circumstances indicating that
the transactions were part of a distribution of securities on behalf of
their principal. The court did go on to state, however, that a distribution
was effected since the sales were substantial in relation to the number of
shares outstanding. 0
Although the court emphasized that section 4(4) and its counter-
part Rule 154 do not provide an exemption for the control person, it is
contended that Rule 154 does so indirectly, i.e., if a broker is not an
underwriter within section 2 (11) because his "control" principal was not
involved in a distribution as defined in Rule 154, no transaction involving
either an issuer or an underwriter would result. Thus, if Wolfson had
complied with the definition of a routine trade within the limits of Rule
154, he would have been entitled to the section 4(1) exemption.
VI. CONCLUSION
As discussed above, the ramifications of Rule 154 are far-reaching.
The broker is directly affected by its limitations, i.e., he can take advan-
tage of the section 4(4) broker's exemption for his part of the trans-
action only if his "control" principal's activities with regard to the
securities are deemed a routine trade and not a distribution within the
meaning of Rule 154. The control person, on the other hand, apparently
can employ the section 4(1) exemption unless his activities with regard
to the securities are deemed a distribution within Rule 154.
In spite of the SEC's manifest concern with affording due process
to potential violators of its securities laws, it is this writer's opinion that
Rule 154 and security releases explaining the rule have fallen short with
respect to the question of repetitive compliance with the rule in succes-
sive six-month periods. Securities Act Release No. 4818 states, in essence,
that repetitive compliance in successive six-month periods with the 1%
guideline may still result in a distribution, but no further guidelines are
given. A bailout contrary to the intent of the Securities Act of 1933 and
Rule 154 can certainly be effected by repetitive compliance with Rule
154. However, since the penalty for selling unregistered stock in the
absence of an exemption could be incarceration, as in the Wolfson case,
a high degree of clarity of notice should be afforded potential violators
of the complex securities law.
Perhaps the means for presenting the public wth a clear, precise rule,
$0. United States v. Wolfson, 405 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1968).
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and at the same time keeping with the intent and purpose of Rule 154,
is the substitute rule now under consideration by the SEC:
Some consideration has . . . been given by the staff to modi-
fication of Rule 154 by the adoption of a substitute rule under
3(b) which would have a $300,000 limit and require prior
notice to the Commission. The rule might also be calculated
on the basis of a twelve-month period rather than six-months
so that we would not be as concerned with respect to repeat
sales.5 '
51. Shreve, Unsolicited Brokers' Transactions and Investment Stock, in SEcURIrIEs
LAWS AND REGULATIONS INSTITUTE 91, 103 (H. Sowards ed. 1967).
